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GOD'S PERFECTION AND FREEDOM: 
A REPLY TO MORRISTON 
Robert T. Lehe 
In a recent article in Faith and Philosophy, Wesley Morriston argues that Plantinga's 
Free Will Defense is incompatible with his version of the ontological argument because 
the former requires that God be free in a sense that precludes a requirement of the 
latter-that God be morally perfect in all possible worlds. God's perfection, according 
to Morriston, includes moral goodness, which requires that God be free in the sense that 
entails that in some possible worlds God performs wrong actions. I argue that Morriston's 
intention is based upon a faulty conception of both God's perfection and His freedom. 
God's perfection does not entail that He has moral obligations which in some possible 
worlds He fails to discharge, and His freely performing an action does not entail that 
there are possible worlds in which He does not perform it. 
In a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy, Wesley Morriston argues that 
Plantinga's Free Will Defense of God's existence is incompatible with his version 
of the ontological argument. I He does this by arguing that a requirement of the 
ontological argument is that God is morally perfect in all possible worlds, but 
that an implication of the Free Will Defense is that God cannot be morally perfect 
in all possible worlds. God cannot be morally perfect in all possible worlds, 
says Morriston, because moral goodness requires freedom, and freedom. entails 
the logical possibility of wrongdoing-that in some possible worlds an agent 
with freedom commits a wrong action. It turns out that for Morriston moral 
perfection in all possible worlds is a logical impossibility, since it would imply 
the impossibility of wrongdoing, but for the perfection to be moral an agent 
possessing it must be significantly free, which implies the possibility of wrong-
doing. It is the purpose of this paper to show that Morriston's attack on Plantinga' s 
Free Will Defense is based upon a misconception of God's perfection and of 
God's freedom. These misconceptions undermine not only the compatibility of 
the Free Will Defense and the ontological argument, but also any adequate 
conception of God's perfection. 
According to the Free Will Defense as Plantinga and Morriston discuss it, the 
goodness of God is compatible with the existence of evil in the world, since the 
latter is a consequence of God's having created persons with significant freedom, 
which is a condition of the possibility of God's having created a world with as 
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much moral goodness as the actual world has. A world without moral evil would 
also be a world without moral goodness, and it is possible that the amount of 
moral goodness in the actual world so overbalances the evil as to make the world 
a very good one. Because the Free Will Defense depends upon the preeminent 
value of moral goodness, it entails, according to Morriston, that God must have 
moral goodness as an attribute. This in tum entails that God must also be 
significantly free in the sense that entails that there are possible worlds in which 
God does wrong. Morriston infers this from the fact that Plantinga defines 
significant freedom in the following way: 
If a person is free with respect to a given action, then he is free to 
perform that action and free to refrain from performing it; no antecedent 
conditions and/or casual laws determine that he will perform the action, 
or that he won't. It is within his power, at the time in question, to take 
or perform the action and within his power to refrain from it. 2 
Since freedom entails the possibility of either performing or not performing an 
action, anyone of God's freely performed good actions must be one which in 
some possible world God refrains from doing. This, however, is inconsistent 
with God's absolute perfection, according to which God is free from defect in 
all possible worlds in which he exists. 
The principal difficulties with Morriston's arguments stem from the way he 
understands God's perfection and God's freedom. Let us take up first what 
Morriston says about moral perfection. He claims that God's perfection must 
include-in order for Plantinga's Free Will Defense to work-moral goodness. 
This kind of goodness is better than nonmoral goodness, and God must have 
the best kind of goodness. It is certainly true that moral virtue is more valuable 
than pleasure, or proficiency in cooking, but it certainly does not follow from 
this that the most perfect being must be a moral being in the sense that entails 
that in some possible worlds God commits error. We may see this by considering 
what Kant says about God's moral perfection and how God's moral perfection 
implies the impossibility of His failure to conform to the moral law . 3 Kant argues 
that the greatest good is a good will, and that for finite persons, having a good 
will requires acting out of respect for law. Having duties requires that one be 
subject to a law which is objectively necessary, but the adherence to which is 
subjectively contingent. That is to say, the law is obligatory, but a person must 
freely decide whether to obey it, and it is possible for a person not to obey it. 
Now Kant says that God has no duties, no moral obligations, inasmuch as for 
him the moral law is subjectively as well as objectively necessary. In every 
possible world, God perfectly conforms to the law. We could even say, perhaps, 
that God is not morally good, if we understand this as implying not that God is 
inferior to moral agents, but that His manner of being and perfection is such 
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that it is not appropriate to attribute to Him obligations and duties, insofar as 
having duties is something only finite persons can do. Kant would say that God 
is morally good, but his manner of being morally good does not involve having 
obligations and duties which He must struggle to discharge, and which He might 
fail to discharge. For having such duties implies being subject to a law above 
oneself, and there is no law above God, and no standard of goodness transcendent 
to Him to which He must conform His will. It is not that God is inferior by 
lacking moral qualities. His way of lacking moral duties is different from that 
of a subhuman creature. (It is misleading to say God lacks moral duties because 
to have duties, and to be subject to a law above oneself, is itself due to a lack 
in one's being-a lack of absolute autonomy.) A gorilla has no duties because 
it does not have a rational will, and so it is inferior to a person. God has no 
duties because His will is perfectly rational; His inclinations perfectly accord 
with reason. This makes Him more perfect, not less perfect, than moral agents. 
I have made this point in terms of Kant's ethics for the sake of convenience, 
but one could easily reformulate it in terms of other moral theories. If we think 
of moral goodness fundamentally as a matter of exercising moral virtues, then 
for finite persons becoming more virtuous involves actualizing potentialities for 
excellence in the performance of various human activities. Achieving moral 
excellence involves the actualization of potentialities which by their very nature 
are not necessarily actualized. Thus being the sort of person who has as a task 
the achievement of moral virtue implies the contingency of this achievement. 
This would imply that God's goodness does not consist in striving to become 
morally virtuous. But this is not a deficiency on God's part insofar as His not 
being a moral agent in this sense is due to His being already fully actualized, 
absolutely perfect. 
The ontological argument requires that God be the greatest possible being. 
According to Morriston, God can (and must) possess maximal nonmoral greatness 
in every possible world but can possess maximal moral greatness only in some 
possible worlds, including the actual world. Thus God is omnipotent and omnis-
cient in every possible world, but God cannot, since He is morally free, be 
morally perfect in all possible worlds, although He is morally perfect in the 
actual world. Morriston's reasons for saying that God is not morally perfect in 
all possible worlds stem from the implication of the notion of moral goodness 
that an agent possessing it can do so only contingently, since having moral 
obligations implies the possibility of not discharging them. But we need not 
conceive of God's goodness in a way that requires that in some possible worlds 
He does evil. The question then is whether a being that always does good in all 
possible worlds is superior to a being who does wrong in some possible worlds 
(a being whose always doing good is a contingent fact). It seems clear that a 
God who necessarily always does good is better than a God who only contingently 
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always does good-unless there is some logical incoherence in ascribing to God 
the property of always doing good in every possible world. The appeal by the 
Free Will Defender to God's interest in creating a world in which finite persons 
engage in moral struggle does not seem to require that God be a moral agent in 
the sense that entails his doing evil in some possible worlds. 
Now Morriston might argue that I have jumped out of the frying pan· and into 
the fire. I have purchased God's infallibility at the expense of His freedom, and 
it is the latter which is most crucial for the Free Will Defense. This leads to the 
second difficulty in Morriston's discussion of the Free Will Defense4-his con-
ception of God's freedom. There will inevitably be difficulties in reconciling 
God's perfection and freedom so long as freedom is understood exclusively in 
the libertarian sense of having the capacity to either perform or refrain from 
performing actions. Like having moral duties, having this kind of freedom may 
be a defect rather than a perfection. There is a longstanding tradition which 
conceives of God's freedom as consisting not in the possibility of doing otherwise, 
but in the necessity of His being wholly self-determined and in His will being 
wholly determined in accordance with the good. These two points are ultimately 
one insofar as God is the ultimate good. To will what is not good is ultimately 
an expression of self-negation rather than freedom. It is insofar as one's freedom 
is limited that one can impede oneself by doing evil, although of course, a being 
who has the liberty to impede oneself is more free than one who has no liberty 
at all. A more profound sense of freedom than the liberty to do or refrain from 
performing an action is freedom in the sense of being determined by nothing 
and subject to no authority beyond oneself. Plantinga's definition of freedom 
includes the freedom from determination by antecedent causes. For finite persons, 
this sort of freedom may imply the freedom to do otherwise. But in the case of 
God, freedom from determination by antecedent causes does not imply that God 
might or might not perform an action. God is perfectly unified with His own 
being, His own will, and His own goodness, and it is therefore impossible for 
him to do other than what is good. This impossibility is not due to a limitation 
in God, but to the fact that God is perfectly self-determined and perfectly good. 
To ascribe to God a definition of freedom appropriate to finite agents and to 
infer from this that God must be capable (in some possible worlds) of moral 
error is to treat God as a finite person. 
It is crucial to the Free Will Defense that the world as God created it be better 
for having in it creatures who are significantly free inasmuch as freedom makes 
it possible for creatures to achieve moral goodness. Because human beings are 
finite and imperfect, their possessing freedom implies that they must choose 
whether or not to do good, and that they may choose wrongly. Finite persons 
are fallible insofar as they are not perfectly good, absolutely self-determined, 
and in full harmony with their own being and the being of God. But they may 
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participate in God's goodness by striving for and achieving a degree of moral 
goodness. Because of the value attached by the Free Will Defense to moral 
goodness and significant freedom, Morriston regards as crucial to the Free Will 
Defense the assumption that God be morally good and significantly free in 
Plantinga's sense. I have argued that God can be free and morally perfect without 
being "significantly free" in a sense which implies the possibility of His doing 
evil. God must be free and absolutely perfect for the Free Will Defense to be 
successful and to be compatible with the ontological argument. But the manner 
of God's being free is different from and superior to that of human beings. That 
God lacks "significant freedom" in Plantinga' s sense does not diminish the value 
of such freedom for finite persons. For God, being "significantly free" would 
be a defect; but such freedom gives finite persons the possibility of striving for 
a kind of goodness whereby they may more closely resemble God. So we should 
not, as Morriston does, suppose that because the world is better for containing 
finite persons who are significantly free, God must also be free in the same 
sense. That human beings are more like God because they are significantly free 
does not imply that God is free in exactly the same way as human beings. 
The Free Will Defense is not, therefore, incompatible with the ontological 
argument, and, more importantly, is not incompatible with the absolute perfection 
of God. We can conceive of God's freedom and goodness in a way that does 
not imply that there are possible worlds in which God does evil. When one 
avoids ascribing to God modes of goodness and freedom appropriately ascribed 
only to finite persons, the difficulties which Morriston finds in Plantinga's Free 
Will Defense vanish. 
North Central College 
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